IMMIGRATION - AsYLUm - DEPORTATION STANDARDS To BE MET By ILLEGAL ALIENS
APPLYING FOR WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION AND

POLITICAL AsyLum.

Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d

760 (9th Cir. 1990)
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

El Salvadoran native Wilfredo Mendoza Perez entered the United
States illegally on March 11, 1982.1 Mr. Mendoza came to the United
States seeking safety, 2 but the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) began deportation proceedings shortly after Mendoza's apprehension. 3 Mendoza subsequently moved for further consideration of4
his political asylum application, which the Immigration Judge denied.
Mendoza then appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
which also denied his requests.'
Mendoza based his requests for withholding of deportation and
asylum on the claim that he had been threatened with harm shortly
before leaving El Salvador. 6 Mr. Mendoza had been an accountant
for an organization which helped landless farmers form and manage
agricultural cooperatives. 7 Mendoza testified that because of these

Mendoza entered the United States by crosssing the Mexican-American border.
Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 761 (9th Cir. 1990).
2 See following text and accompanying footnotes for discussion of Mendoza's
reasons for fleeing El Salvador.
Mendoza later conceded deportability on March 11, 1985, to the Immigration
Judge handling his case. Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 761.
" The Immigration Judge based his denial of Mendoza's motion on a finding
that he did not show either a "clear probability" or "well-founded fear" of persecution. Id. These standards must be met to qualify for withholding of deportation
and asylum, respectively. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982 and Supp. 1988); 8 U.S.C.
§§ l101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a).
I The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge's finding that Mendoza did not meet
either of the applicable standards. Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 761.
6 Mendoza claimed to have received a letter at his home threatening he would
"suffer the consequences" if he did not leave the country within forty-eight hours.
He felt he should take these threats seriously because he supposedly knew of others
in his situation who had been killed after receiving similar threats. It should be
noted that Mendoza was unable to produce this letter during any of the relevant
proceedings, with his wife claiming that it had been destroyed. Id. at 761-62.
Mendoza was an accountant with the Salvadoran Communal Union for a three
to five year period before leaving his country. Id. at 761.
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activities he would be singled out and subject to great harm if forced
to return to El Salvador. 8
To avoid deportation, Mendoza appealed the BIA's decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 9 The court found Mendoza's testimony credible 0 and illustrative of a specific, individualized threat."
The court also determined that petitioner met both the "clear probability" and "well-founded fear of persecution" standards. 2 On appeal from the BIA, held, reversed and remanded in part for exercise
of the Attorney General's discretion on the asylum claim. 3 An illegal
alien applying for withholding of deportation and political asylum
may meet the requisite standards strictly on the basis of his own
uncorroborated testimony. Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1990).
II.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

InternationalLaw and United States Statutes

In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) 4 and created section 243(h) thereof." This section allowed the
Attorney General to withhold deportation of any alien who could
show a "clear probability of persecution" if he were forced to return

to his country.

6

In 1965, Congress amended section 243(h) to require

Petitioner claimed fear of reprisal by the Salvadoran government, who saw
his type of work as encouragement to the peasants to join the guerrilla forces. Id.
9 Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 760.
,0 Because the Immigration Judge and the BIA made no finding on Mendoza's
credibility, his statements were presumed credible by the court. Id. at 761; see Artiga
Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1987).
1, The court treated the letter as an individualized threat because other persons
within Mendoza's organization had presumably been singled out for harm. Mendoza
Perez, 902 F.2d at 762. This evidence therefore met the court's requirement that
persecution be directed at an alien as an individual. Id. at 761 (citing Estrada v.
INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985)).
12 For an explanation of these standards, see the Legal Background section, infra.
Because the well-founded fear standard is easier to meet than the clear probability
standard under INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1987), Mendoza
qualified for asylum as well as for withholding of deportation. Mendoza Perez, 902
F.2d at 763.
11The granting of asylum is vested in the discretion of the Attorney General,
even if an alien meets the well-founded fear standard. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
at 450.
14 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-57 (1952).
158 U.S.C. § 1253(h).

16 Id. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984) (clear probability of persecution
must be shown to avoid deportation under Section 243(h)).
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demonstration of a clear probability of persecution based on "race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
7
political opinion."'
In 1968, the United States acceded to the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).' 8 The Protocol defined
the term "refugee," 1 9 and in doing so created the "well-founded fear
of persecution" standard. 2° This definition includes the same five
criteria contained in section 243(h) for establishing evidence of persecution. 2' To conform United States law to the Protocol and thereby
to the law of other nations, Congress created the Refugee Act of
1980 (Act)." The Act accomplished this goal by amending the INA
to include the Protocol's definition of "refugee. ' 23 Congress also
added section 208(a) to the INA, authorizing the Attorney General
to grant asylum to aliens determined to be refugees34 Furthermore,
the Refugee Act amended section 243(h) by restricting the Attorney
25
General's discretion in withholding of deportation proceedings.

1 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1). To qualify under this section, the alien must show a
clear probability of persecution for one of the five statutory reasons by the government or a group the government cannot control. See, e.g., Canjura Flores v.
INS, 784 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1985); Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723.
1, United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for accession Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6261, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (accession by United
States Nov. 1, 1968).
,9 Article I(A) of the Protocol defines the term "refugee" as one who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion ... is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of [his] country.
Id.
'0 Aliens applying for asylum must demonstrate a "well-founded fear" of persecution. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421. The well-founded fear standard does
not require persecution to be more likely than not, since "one can certainly have
a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance
of the occurrence taking place." Id. at 431. Thus, this standard does not change
or lessen the necessary focus on an alien's subjective beliefs. Id.
1 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)(1982); see text accompanying note 17.
2 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-59 (1982).
23 Id.; see supra note 19 (Protocol's definition of refugee).
' 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). The addition of section 208(a) allowed aliens physically present within the United States to apply for asylum, while previously the
only remedy available to such aliens was to apply for withholding of deportation.
Id.; Casenote, The Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Standard in Asylum Proceedings: The Promise of Solace For Refugees After INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 19
Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 217 (1987).
"5 Section 243(h) states that the Attorney General must withhold deportation of
an alien who shows there would be a clear probability of persecution were he to
return home. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)(1982 and Supp. 1988).
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Supreme Court Construction

26
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided the case of INS v. Stevic.
Yugoslavian native Predrag Stevic had petitioned for withholding of
deportation under section 243(h) of the INA, claiming he would be
imprisoned if forced to return home. 27 The Board of Immigration
Appeals denied his request,2 as did the Supreme Court. 29 The Court
held that "an alien must establish a clear probability of persecution
to avoid deportation under 243(h)." ' 30 Although the Court did not
specifically define the term "well-founded fear of persecution," it
did imply that this standard is not equivalent to the clear probability
3
standard governing deportation cases .
Since INS v. Stevic,3 2 a well-founded fear of persecution has been
solidified as the applicable standard for asylum proceedings. In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 33 the Ninth Circuit held that the standards for
withholding of deportation and granting of asylum differed, with the
34
well-founded fear standard being the least stringent of the two.
These findings were subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court; 35
however, the Court did not specifically state the necessary elements
36
for each standard or how they should be applied.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS,
the various circuits have created differing interpretations of the standards of proof required for the withholding of deportation and asylum
and of the amount of evidence needed to satisfy them. The Ninth

- 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
2
Stevic claimed to have been active in an anti-Communist organization and
feared imprisonment for this reason. Id. at 410.
2 The BIA found that Stevic did not present evidence of a clear probability of
persecution. Id. at 410-11.

Id. at 413.
30 Id. The Court

went on to explain that the question under the clear probability
standard is "whether it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to
persecution." Id. at 424.
11Id. at 429-30. The Court also determined that an alien who seeks withholding
of deportation under section 243(h) is not entitled to it just because he qualifies as
a "refugee." Id. at 428.
32 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
"' 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).

Id. at 1451. This holding means that an alien who satisfies the clear probability
standard automatically becomes eligible for asylum as well. Id.
11Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421. Here, the Court specifically held wellfounded fear of persecution to be the applicable standard for discretionary asylum
proceedings under section 208(a). Id. at 436.
36 Id. at 448.
',
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Circuit has interpreted clear probability to mean greater than a fifty
percent chance.3 1 Persecution must be directed at an individual, and
evidence of general violence in the alien's country is not enough to
show clear probability; 38 however, such evidence may be used to
support the alien's specific claims.3 9 In asylum cases, the Ninth Circuit
requires a showing that the alien's fear is "genuine" 4 and that
4
persecution is a "reasonable possibility." '
Among the various circuits, some have employed the standards in
a fashion similar to that of the Ninth Circuit, while others have
differed somewhat. The Third Circuit has equated clear probability
with a well-founded fear of persecution, 42 while the Fourth Circuit
has declined to decide whether the standards are identical. 4 The Fifth
Circuit has held the well-founded fear standard to be more generous.4
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has maintained that the well-founded fear
test requires less proof than the clear probability test. 45 In CarvajalMunoz v. INS,46 the Seventh Circuit held that the two standards
differed somewhat. 47

III.

ANALYSIS

In interpreting the applicable standards for withholding of deportation and political asylum, the Ninth Circuit has significantly departed in four areas from the reasoning of the other circuits.

17 See

Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424; Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723; Estrada, 775

F.2d at 1021.
38 775 F.2d at 1021.

19See Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723; Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 564
(9th Cir. 1984).
40 Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985).
41 Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 440.
42 Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1982); Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532
(3d Cir. 1985)(clear probability standard applied in an asylum proceeding).
43 Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1522 (4th Cir. 1986); see generally Note,
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca:The Last Word on the
Standard of Prooffor Asylum Proceedings?, 13 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 171

(1988).
Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
41 Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984); Dolores v. INS, 772
F.2d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 1985).
743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
" The Seventh Circuit found that the two standards were very similar but not
identical. Id. at 575. The court held that newspaper articles of a general nature were
not enough to show that the petitioner's fear of persecution was well-founded. Id.
at 577.
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Standard of Appellate Review

The Ninth Circuit differs from other circuits in its use of the
substantial evidence standard. This standard inherently favors aliens
by making it easier for them to successfully argue that an unfavorable
decision by an immigration judge was not supported by substantial
evidence 5 The Ninth Circuit's use of this standard began with Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS. 49 In Bolanos-Hernandez, the court held that
the limited "abuse of discretion" standard of review was no longer
applicable, and began to employ the heightened, "substantial evidence" standard in reviewing withholding of deportation denials. 0
The standard of appellate review used by the other circuits is the
abuse of discretion standard, which limits their role to determining
whether the BIA has abused its discretion in denying the alien's
request for withholding of deportation. 51 Exercise of this standard is
based on the idea that appellate court judges should disturb the
findings of lower courts only where a grave mistake has clearly been
made. 52 Circuits following the abuse of discretion standard include
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.53
In Bolanos-Hernandez,54 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the substantial evidence standard should be used because relief under section
243(h) of the INA was no longer discretionary after passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980. 5 The court reasoned that since the language
of section 243(h) was now mandatory, the standard of review should
56
be increased.
Although this reasoning may appear logical, it goes against the
congressional intent of sections 243(h) and 208(a). When section 243(h)

, Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 765 (Sneed, J., concurring specially).
767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). This case involved an El Salvadoran native who
testified that he feared death at the hands of guerrilla forces if his asylum application
were not granted. Id. at 1280.
10Id. at 1282 n.8.
11See Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 411 (6th Cir. 1987).

52Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 764 (Sneed, J., concurring specially).

11See Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 826 (1987)(deference should be given to the agency to which Congress has
given responsibility for administering statutory requirements); for similar applications
of abuse of discretion standard see Gumbol, 815 F.2d at 411; McLeod v. INS, 802
F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 1986); Cruz-Lopez, 802 F.2d at 1523.
54 Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
1 Id. at 1281; see supra note 25 (Attorney General prohibited from deporting

aliens showing a clear probability of persecution).
6

Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1282 n.8.
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was amended, Congress did not also include any provision allowing
the Ninth Circuit to employ its own standard of review. Congress
specifically curtailed the authority of the Attorney General,5 7 but it
did not increase the authority of appellate court judges. Accordingly,
there is no statutory or legislative construction on which the Ninth
Circuit can ground its reasoning.
Similarly, there is no case precedent for the Ninth Circuit to rely
upon except its own, since all other circuits that have addressed the
issue follow the abuse of discretion standard.5 8 The Ninth Circuit
should conform its reasoning to that of the other circuits to promote
the principles of fairness and uniformity. The United States in the
international context has traditionally stood for fairness and justice,
but this image becomes tarnished when one alien stands a better
chance of being granted asylum or withholding of deportation simply
because he or she resides in a particular geographical area. The Ninth
Circuit's stance also contradicts the principle of uniformity, which
was the goal the United States had in mind when it acceded to the
United Nations Protocol.5 9
B.

The Credibility Requirement

The Ninth Circuit also diverges from its fellow circuits on the issue
of the credibility of an applicant's testimony. In the Ninth Circuit,
an alien's own testimony will be controlling if it is "credible and
supported by general documentary evidence that the threats should
be considered serious." 6 However, if the immigration judge and the
BIA do not make a specific finding on the alien's credibility, then
his or her statements will be presumed credible for the purposes of
appellate review. 61 With this presumption already in his or her favor,
it becomes much simpler for an alien to meet the credibility requirement.
In determining an alien's credibility, the other circuits use a more
careful method of scrutiny. These courts make no presumption of
credibility and are cautious in giving weight to an alien's own tes-

57 Id.

" See supra note 47 and accompanying text for discussion of other circuits'
decisions.
19See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text discussing the United States'
accession to the Protocol.
60 Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723; see Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285.
" Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 761; see Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723.
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timony. 62 For example, the Sixth Circuit has stated that the petitioner's

"own conjecture or subjective allegations" would not be considered
credible evidence for purposes of meeting the clear probability stan-

dard. 63 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has also limited the strength to
be accorded to an alien's testimony."
Once again, the Ninth Circuit has created a judicial fiction for its
own purposes. It has not pointed to any statute or law authorizing

it to make such a presumption of credibility. Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit contradicts itself by requiring the alien to provide specific
evidence corroborating his or her testimony as to the clear probability
of persecution, 65 while often accepting the alien's unsubstantiated

testimony. Congress did not create sections 243(h) and 208(a) for all
aliens wishing to remain in the United States. These special provisions
for withholding deportation and asylum were created to assist only
those aliens meeting the specific statutory qualifications." By pre-

suming credibility, the Ninth Circuit gives an alien a head start he
or she may not deserve on meeting the statutory requirements. The
application of different standards to similarly situated aliens within

the same country undermines what should be a uniform national
immigration policy. Congress has attempted to legislate such a policy

in accordance with international immigration standards. The Ninth
Circuit's unique determination of credibility is inconsistent with this
attempt.
C. External Evidence
Closely related to the credibility issue is the Ninth Circuit's failure

to require external evidence to corroborate an alien's testimony. In
6 Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 765. According to Justice Sneed, other courts are
cautious of an alien's own statements because they tend to be self-serving.

613Gumbol,

815 F.2d at 411.

In Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[Tihe applicant's uncorroborated testimony will be insufficient to meet the
evidentiary burden unless it is credible, persuasive, and points to specific
facts that give rise to an inference that the applicant has been or has a
good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution ....
743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)(emphasis in original).
65 See Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, the court
found petitioner's introduction of newspaper articles describing the violence in El
Salvador to be insufficient evidence to meet his burden of proving a clear probability
of persecution. Id. at 1392.
6 The five statutuory bases for persecution common to both standards are race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a), 1253(h)(1).
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the Ninth Circuit, an alien need not present any external corroborating
evidence to substantiate his or her allegations of persecution. 67 Even
though an alien is required to show that the persecution, if carried
out, would be directed toward him or her as an individual,6 the alien
may meet this burden solely by his or her own testimony. 69
In marked contrast, all other circuits have required an alien to give
some external corroborating evidence.70 In Farzad v. INS, 7' the Fifth
Circuit found that the petitioner did not meet the well-founded fear
standard because he could produce no proof that his political activities
were known to the government.72 In a similar case, the Sixth Circuit
also demonstrated its reliance on external proof. In Gumbol v. INS,"7

the court held that the petitioner did not meet the clear probability
standard even though he had submitted an affidavit from a friend
to back up his own testimony that he had been attacked at his
workplace in Iraq.7 4 According to the Sixth Circuit, this evidence was
75
insufficient to overcome the stringent external proof requirement.
At the present time, the Ninth Circuit's relaxed standards of proof
76
open the door to questionable statements by aliens. The instant case
illustrates the inherent difficulty of ascertaining the truth that arises
with use of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. Here, the petitioner (Mendoza) was allowed to prevail on his claims for asylum and withholding
of deportation without producing the document which served as the
basis for his entire case." The only explanation offered for the failure
to produce the alleged letter was that it had been destroyed. 78 But,
Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 766.
" Estrada, 775 F.2d at 1021.
0 Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 766; see, e.g., Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723.
70 Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 766.
71 802 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1986)(per curiam).
,2Petitioner Farzad claimed to have supported an anti-Khomeini group while in
his native country of Iran. The Fifth Circuit held that he did not meet the standard
for asylum since "[tihe record does not indicate that Farzad has been identified by
Iranian authorities as a political opponent seeking to overthrow the present regime."
Id. at 125.
,3815 F.2d 406, 413 (6th Cir. 1987).
4 The petitioner claimed to have been beaten by members of Iraq's ruling party
because of his Christianity. Id. at 410.
,-In ruling against the petitioner, the court stated he "presented no evidence,
other than his own unsubstantiated testimony, that this alleged attack was anything
more than an isolated incident or that it was not motivated by personal animosity
rather than by political beliefs." Id. at 412.
16 Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 760.
" Id. at 766.
18 Id. at 762.
67
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it seems just as plausible that the letter never existed at all.
The Ninth Circuit's obviation of the external evidence requirement
also contradicts the general rule of deference to administrative decisions. 79 In the context of deportation and asylum proceedings, Congress has delegated the responsibility for statutory interpretation to
the BIA and the immigration judges.8 0 By employing its own evidentiary standards, the Ninth Circuit is not entrusting the BIA or
the immigration judges with the full authority Congress intended
them to have.
D. Political Neutrality as an Opinion
The last point on which the Ninth Circuit differs from the other
circuits concerns the meaning of the term "political opinion" with
respect to establishing persecution. The Ninth Circuit has held that
political neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of section 243(h), 8'
but other circuits have held to the contrary. 82
Although the Ninth Circuit claims that remaining neutral is indeed
a political opinion, this interpretation is not supported by the applicable statutes. Sections 243(h) and 208(a) both include the phrase
"political opinion," but nowhere do they include the phrase "political
neutrality." One may assume that if Congress had intended to include
political neutrality, it would have explicitly done so.
As a concept of international law, political asylum was intended
to protect those aliens from persecution who had politically opposed
their government. 83 The idea of neutrality is inconsistent with taking
an active stand for a cause one believes in. Allowing the Ninth Circuit
to define political neutrality as an opinion minimizes the significance

79 "Where Congress has made either an explicit or implicit delegation of authority
to an agency to fill the gaps in a statute and to provide meaning to particular terms
... we must give 'considerable weight' to the executive department's construction."
Perlera Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th
Cir. 1990).

10 Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 766.
11 See, e.g., Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989). Here,
the court noted that "[c]hoosing to remain neutral is no less a political decision
than choosing to affiliate with a particular political faction." (quoting BolanosHernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286). Id.
82 See Perlera Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1292.
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to follow the language of the Ninth Circuit in Bolanos-Hernandez, stating
that "in the context of a civil war . . . the BIA has declined to apply the principle
that a desire to remain neutral is an expression of a political opinion for purposes
of asylum and withholding of deportation." Id. at 1298.
13 Mendoza Perez, 902 F.2d at 767 (Sneed, J., concurring specially).
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of the claims of those aliens whom asylum was intended to protect.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit stands on its own in interpreting the clear probability and well-founded fear of persecution standards applicable to
withholding of deportation and political asylum proceedings. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit differs regarding the proper appellate standard
of review, determination of credibility, necessity of external corroborating proof, and the definition of the phrase "political opinion."
The Ninth Circuit reviews BIA decisions under a substantial evidence
standard, while other circuits employ the abuse of discretion standard.
The Ninth Circuit presumes an alien's statements to be credible if
the lower courts have not found to the contrary, but other circuits
make no such presumption. The Ninth Circuit does not require external proof to corroborate an alien's own testimony, but other circuits
do. Finally, the Ninth Circuit allows political neutrality to qualify
as an opinion, while other circuits do not.
The law according to the Ninth Circuit as it presently stands does
not conform to either the intent of Congress or to international law.
In order to establish harmony with these two important political
aspects and to promote equal treatment of all aliens, the law of the
Ninth Circuit with respect to these issues should be harmonized with
that of its fellow circuits.
Theodosia Gavatides

